Social epidemiology is the study of relations between social factors and health status in populations. Although recent decades have witnessed a rapid development of this research program in scope and sophistication, causal inference has proven to be a persistent dilemma due to the natural assignment of exposure level based on unmeasured attributes of individuals, which may lead to substantial confounding. Some optimism has been expressed about randomized social interventions as a solution to this long-standing inferential problem. We review the causal inference problem in social epidemiology, and the potential for causal inference in randomized social interventions. Using the example of a currently on-going intervention that randomly assigns families to non-poverty housing, we review the limitations to causal inference even under experimental conditions and explain which causal effects become identifiable. We note the benefit of using the randomized trial as a conceptual model, even for design and interpretation of observational studies in social epidemiology. r
Social epidemiology is the study of relations between social factors and disease in populations, broadly interpreted to subsume differential occurrence of any risk factor across groups categorized according to any of a number of socially defined axes. Primary among these in contemporary Western societies are race/ethnicity, gender and socioeconomic class/position (Krieger, Rowley, Herman, Avery, & Phillips, 1993; Lynch & Kaplan, 2000, Chapter 2) . Social epidemiology therefore embraces a large number of potential questions about exposures and outcomes, and indeed one might question whether there is any epidemiology that is not social epidemiology (Shy, 1996) . The distinction appears to be that social epidemiology is characterized by explicit inclusion of sociological quantities in the analytic model or by explicit reference to sociological theory in the interpretation. Therefore, any exposure-disease relation can be studied from the point of view of social epidemiology to the extent that the relation is modeled and interpreted in light of social variation in the quantities under study, interpreted in the context of a sociologic theory or sociohistorical paradigm, such as ''development, '' ''urbanization,'' or ''colonialism.'' There are two distinct types of general epidemiologic activity, both well represented in social epidemiology: surveillance and etiologic inference. In surveillance, we merely seek to accurately describe what the world looks like (Buehler, 1998) . This involves challenging problems of definition, measurement, sampling, and generalizability, but at the conceptual level the activity is relatively straightforward. For Social Epidemiology, examples include describing the racial and social class distribution of coronary disease (Barnett, Armstrong, & Casper, 1999) , or the changing distribution of HIV/AIDS incidence among ''men who have sex with men'' by racial/ ethnic group (Anonymous, 2000) . Although we often seek to generalize beyond our observed sample, the purpose is entirely descriptive. The focus is on occurrence of an outcome, perhaps in relation to a scaled axis, such as time, age, or social class, but without regard to a specific exposure. The epidemiologic quantity of interest is generally an occurrence measure itself, such as prevalence or incidence, rather than an estimate of epidemiologic effect, which is formed as the contrast of two or more occurrence measures under a model of counterfactual action (Greenland, Robins, & Pearl, 1999) .
The second class of epidemiologic activity is etiologic inference, in which we seek to understand the causal relation between a defined exposure and outcome. This activity is designed not to describe the world as it exists, but rather how it would change under some defined, generally hypothetical, intervention. For social epidemiology, examples would include the study of behavioral intermediates in the observed relation between socioeconomic status and all-cause mortality (Lantz et al., 1998) , or the quantification of how much excess mortality is attributable to poverty (Hahn et al., 1995) .
Although etiologic investigations constitute the bulk of published epidemiologic work, the logical foundation of this inferential process-gleaning from passive observation what would pertain under active intervention-remains a subject of contentious debate (Pearl, 2000; Shafer, 1996) . Despite the many philosophical and methodological problems associated with causal inference, epidemiologists are firmly committed to this activity by virtue of the field being situated within the larger domain of public health. This disciplinary identity fixes intervention as the primary focus of epidemiologic research (Breslow, 1998) .
Causation in social epidemiology
Although the scope of social epidemiology includes surveillance, we focus here on studies that seek to identify effects of social variables. Because a causal effect is defined on the basis of contrasts between (potentially counterfactual) intervention regimes, many authors argue that we must immediately exclude nonmanipulable factors, such as individual race/ethnicity and gender, from consideration as causes in this sense (Kaufman & Cooper, 1999) . Modifiable exposures of potential interest to social epidemiologists would include factors such as income, education, and housing quality. Although these are usually obtained in human society according to complex interactions of social stratification and individual volition, they are potentially modified through public policy via governmental programs of income supplementation, educational loans, and housing assistance.
Etiologic interest is in the contrast between outcome distributions under various intervention regimes that fix the level of the exposure in the target population. For ease of presentation we focus discussion on a binary outcome (Y ¼ 1 if disease occurs during the period of observation, Y ¼ 0 otherwise), although causal effects for other outcome distributions are readily defined. In order to make the exposition more concrete, we identify this outcome as an asthma attack, and we specify a social exposure of interest with an example: residence in subsidized privately owned housing (X ¼ 1) versus residence in a public housing project (X ¼ 0).
As a notational convention to represent intervention, several sources in the statistical and epidemiologic literature make use of a subscript on the outcome variable (Y X ¼x ) to indicate the variable conditioned on forcing the target population to exposure level x (Holland, 1986; Robins, 1989a, b) . Pearl has employed several notional conventions (Pearl, 2000, p. 70) , but here we adopt his ''SET'' notation, which expresses intervention as SET½X ¼ x: Thus, the outcome distribution under various intervention regimes is succinctly expressed as PrðY ¼ yjSET½X ¼ x). These distributions of Y enable computation of outcome contrasts between all possible values of x taken by X : For example, for the causal effect of housing type on asthma, common contrasts would include the difference or ratio between the risks of an asthma attack in the target population during the specified time period if households were assigned to public housing versus if they were assigned to private housing.
Confounding in social epidemiology
It is an age-old dictum in statistics that ''association does not equal causation;'' the implications of this simple mantra form the central challenge of etiologic inference from observational data. The hypothesis of a causal relation between housing type and asthma attacks (arc b in Fig. 1 ) seems plausible, but subject matter knowledge suggests other influences on health outcome (arc c in Fig. 1 ) from quantities that also potentially influence residential housing type (arc a in Fig. 1 ). This configuration implies that some part of the empirical association observed between housing type (X ) and asthma attack (Y ) may arise not from the causal link between them, but rather due to their mutual response to other conditions such as poverty (V ).
The task is to contrast the proportion of the target population who would suffer asthma attacks if assigned to private housing with the proportion who would suffer asthma attacks if assigned to public housing, during the specified time period: PrðY ¼ 1jSET½X ¼ 1Þ versus PrðY ¼ 1jSET½X ¼ 0Þ: The crux of the problem in observational data is that we do not have the opportunity to actually carry out these ''settings'' of the population, and so we must manipulate the observed quantities in some way to more validly estimate the causal effect of interest. Clearly the crude contrast of observed asthma risks, PrðY ¼ 1jX ¼ 1Þ versus PrðY ¼ 1jX ¼ 0Þ; is not adequate, as these conditional probabilities differ not only because of the causal effect of X ; but also because of the correlated perturbation in X and Y by V :
The usual epidemiologic solution is to condition in some way on poverty status. The logic behind this strategy is that within the categorizations of V (e.g., poor and non-poor if poverty is dichotomous), there can be no confounding by this quantity (Greenland & Morgenstern, 2001 ). Formally, this adjustment provides a statistically unbiased estimate of the true causal effect for X on Y when, within each stratum of V ; observed exposure X is statistically independent of the potential response (Y jSET½X ¼ x) for each imposed value x (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) .
To the extent that we have enumerated and accurately measured a sufficient set of common ancestors of exposure and outcome, this conventional epidemiologic solution is entirely adequate for the specification of the desired causal effect from observational data in pointexposure studies. Indeed, this strategy for the estimation of causal effects dominates epidemiologic analysis of observational data, and has enjoyed some success. For exposures related to human behavior, however, the prospects are not nearly as hopeful. This is because the enumeration and accurate measurement of common causes for multifactorial disease outcomes and complex behaviors such as residential housing choices is a daunting task. Behaviors with economic and social inputs have proven quite difficult to model in the social sciences (Heckman & Hotz, 1989) , and even if we know all the factors that determine where a person would choose to live, the prospects of obtaining accurate measures of these many variables in a real data set are somewhat dim. For example, we must make some necessarily arbitrary definition of ''poverty'' in the example above by obtaining reported information on a limited number of material factors considered likely to influence both housing type and exposure to other causes of an asthma attack.
Randomization in social epidemiology
An intuitively attractive solution to this problem is to physically block all causal pathways leading into the exposure. This means interrupting all paths represented by arrow-heads that terminate at the node for exposure, such as arc a in Fig. 1 in the example above. Rather than having to identify and accurately measure all factors that may potentially affect housing and asthma risk, we accomplish this blocking of arrows leading into X merely by randomizing the exposure within the target population with a ''coin flip'' (Fig. 2) .
Under randomization, housing type is determined by only one input, the value of the ''coin flip.'' Since this clearly has no bearing on an asthma attack, we may expect no confounding, despite not having to laboriously catalogue, measure and control for myriad covariates. As a consequence of successful randomization, these other factors tend to be balanced between the groups assigned to each of the housing treatments. For instance, we would expect the same proportion of poor and non-poor in each group. This is why randomized trials have proven so attractive, so useful and so persuasive, in medical literature over the last 50 years (Altman & Bland, 1999) . Indeed, some have gone so far as to assert that for evaluation of treatments, only randomized trials have any value whatsoever (Doll, 1994) . The utility of randomized trials for social epidemiology, in which the prospect for adequate control of confounding by conditioning on measured covariates appears particularly hopeless, would therefore seem obvious (Stephenson & Imrie, 1998 to conduct systematic reviews of social policy interventions in analogy with the Cochrane Collaboration's systematic reviews of medical interventions (http:// www.cochrane.org).
Above and beyond the issue of control for confounding, randomized social interventions also offer the advantage of forcing us to clearly define the intervention regime. In an observational study we might seek to estimate the effect of education on mortality, for instance, by querying participants about their years of completed education, then contrasting the mortality proportions in each exposure group after some followup period. Additionally, we might condition this estimate on observed covariates in order to reduce confounding bias in the estimation of the true causal education effect (Elo & Preston, 1996) . Although this is the common approach in observational social epidemiology, at no time are we forced to define this causal effect in terms of the exact hypothetical intervention implied by contrasts of years of completed education. In an experimental trial, how might we force participants to remain in school if they were randomized to higher level of education then they would attain under a natural mechanism, or force participants to leave school if they were randomized to lower level of education then they would naturally attain? These are the counterfactual contrasts we are presumably trying to estimate by adjusting for correlates of schooling achievement in the observational data, but the adequacy of such an adjustment rests on assumptions about the meaning of the education quantity in this relation and the means by which this would be (hypothetically) manipulated. While questions such as these remain obscured in the observational context, they assume great importance when we contemplate an experimental design.
Limitations of randomized social interventions
Unfortunately, randomized social interventions, though conceptually simple at one level, provide upon closer inspection many significant challenges as well. One practical limitation is that although some medical interventions may be assessed within a short follow-up period, social factors often have impacts on health that have latency periods of decades or more (Power & Hertzman, 1997) . The expense of tracking a large randomized cohort over this period of time would generally be prohibitive, although mortality information, at least, can often be collected from death certificate indices without the excessive expense of active cohort surveillance (Doody, Hayes, & Bilgrad, 2001) .
Randomized social interventions also fail to accurately estimate the effects of social policies if the context, as perceived by the participants, differs between the trial and the policy implementation in such a way as to modify their degree of active participation (Black, 1996) . This is a concern for any intervention trial, especially those for which participants might have a belief about the benefit of the treatment, and where subjects are required to actively participate in the intervention in some way (Brewin & Bradley, 1989) . Social interventions are particularly prone to this limitation, not only because participants are almost certain to harbor an opinion about the value of the treatment, but also because active engagement in the social intervention is especially likely to be context dependent, with degree of compliance a function of various factors such as number of friends and neighbors participating.
Randomized social interventions also pose challenging ethical issues. For most regimens one could potentially assign, an advantaged social condition is generally presumed to be preferable, if not for the outcome under study, then for some other relevant outcome. Although we may wish to better quantify the effect of poverty on health, for example, most would agree that leaving someone in poverty, when a beneficial intervention is available to others in the treatment arm of the study, may be morally indefensible if resources suffice to offer the intervention to everyone (Freedman, 2000) . Ethical considerations may therefore require more creative designs, such as staggered implementation of universal social interventions (Maclure et al., 2001; Feldman, Wang, Willan, & Szalai, 2001) .
Social interventions are also highly prone to ''contamination'' of randomized groups, because, like infectious diseases, many social factors are essentially ''transmissible.'' (Manski, 1993) In the infectious context, for example, causal inference based on assignment of individual units to treatments is biased by inter-unit dependencies that have been well-described in the vaccine efficacy literature (Halloran, Longini, & Struchiner, 1999) . Just as an unvaccinated person experiences reduced risk of infection when another person in the same household is vaccinated, a low-income person experiences reduced risk of suffering the negative consequences of poverty when sharing a household with a high-income person (Krieger, Chen, & Selby, 1999) . Randomization of higher units of aggregation, such as households, neighborhoods or communities, may alleviate this problem to some extent (Ukoumunne, Gulliford, Chinn, Sterne, & Burney, 1999) , but this consideration places severe constraints on the design and interpretation of randomized social interventions in which unit dependency would be expected (Halloran & Struchiner, 1991) .
Defining an estimable causal parameter of interest
A major challenge in deriving valid causal inference from randomized social interventions is that the quantity of etiologic interest rarely corresponds directly to the factor that has been assigned randomly. In clinical trials, the same dilemma often surfaces: patients are assigned a treatment based on a ''coin flip,'' but actively change their actual treatment by failing to adhere to the assigned regimen completely (Pocock & Abdalla, 1998) . When there exists imperfect compliance with assigned regimen and non-compliance is measured, we may choose between estimating the effect of the assignment, known as the ''intent-to-treat'' (ITT) analysis (Lachin, 2000) and attempting to estimate the effect of the treatment itself (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996) .
Although some authors propose that the ITT analysis has direct policy ramifications, because non-compliance is a real characteristic of policy regimen implementation (Sheiner & Rubin, 1995) , others counter that this makes the estimated assignment effect less generalizable, because the degree of compliance reflects the unique context of the trial and will not generally be similar in repetitions of the assignment in other settings (Pearl, 2000, pp. 261-262) . Therefore, an ITT estimator reflects not only the effect of the assigned treatment, but also the degree of compliance and the possible correlation between compliance and potential for individual causal effect, factors which might easily differ from setting to setting. Due to these limitations of the ITT estimator, many researchers focus their attention on the effect of actual treatment received rather than on the effect of assignment, especially those researchers seeking primarily to report etiologic insights rather than recommend policy decisions. Fig. 3 shows a graphical representation of the general situation of random assignment and imperfect compliance in the context of the previous example, in which there exist predictors of compliance (moving to new housing) which are also predictors of the outcome (asthma attack). The causal effect of assignment to housing type (Z) on asthma attack (Y ) may be estimated without bias in this design, since the only arrow leading into assignment is from the randomization mechanism (arc a), which is uncorrelated in expectation with all other measured and unmeasured variables (U). However, since the proportions opting to change to (or remain) in their assigned housing type may depend on numerous incidental factors (arc d), some of which may also influence the outcome of interest (arc e), we may wish to focus instead on the effect of actual housing type residency (arc c). Inspection of Fig. 3 reveals that without further assumptions, the causal effect of actual housing type on probability of asthma attack cannot be reliably estimated, due to potential confounding by unmeasured factors U that are not balanced by randomization. If arc c is the effect that we want to know about, however, there are several options. First, although we cannot derive an unbiased effect estimate, we can bound this effect (Balke & Pearl, 1997) . Alternatively, we can estimate the effect of interest, but only for a particular subset of the target population (Angrist et al., 1996) . Finally, by making additional linearity assumptions about the relations between variables, we may derive an unbiased estimate for the causal effect of interest (Bowden & Turkington, 1984) . Specifically, premised on the assumption that Y ¼ cX þ e Y and X ¼ bZ þ e X ; then even when e Y and X are correlated, one may estimate a regression coefficient b for the (linear) relation Y ¼ bZ þ e 0 Y ; and use this to obtain an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of interest, c ¼ b=b (Pearl, 2000, pp. 89-91; Greenland, 2000) .
A case study of a randomized social intervention
Moving to opportunity
Our example of housing type and asthma attack was chosen because it is based on a real randomized social intervention, the ''moving to opportunity'' (MTO) study, which was conducted to estimate the causal effect of neighborhood of residence on a number of behavioral and health-related outcomes, including injuries, asthma attacks, and criminal victimization (Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2001) . Numerous observational studies have approached this general question of the relations between neighborhood and health (Yen & Kaplan, 1999) , but causal inference is hindered by a large number of potential biases and unmeasured variables (Duncan, Connell, & Klebanov, 1997) . For example, do poor neighborhood conditions make individuals ill, or do people in poor health have reduced income due to illness, which in turn forces them to remain in poor neighborhoods? (Stronks, van de Mheen, van den Bos, & Mackenbach, 1997) .
Because of these apparently intractable problems in observational studies, the MTO investigators developed a randomized experimental design so that truly comparable families could be contrasted in different environments. The experiment was funded by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, and was conducted in five major US cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, New York and Los Angeles, beginning in 1994. To be eligible, families were required to have children and to reside in public housing in census tracts with poverty rates of 40% or greater. There were actually three arms in the MTO design, but we limit our description here simply to experimental and control groups for reasons of brevity. Families in the experimental group received a housing voucher that could be used to pay for rental housing from private landlords in any census tract with less than a 10% poverty rate, as well as counseling assistance in finding a suitable rental unit in the private market and adjusting to the new neighborhood (Feins, Holin, & Phipps, 1994) . In each of the sites, roughly half of those assigned to the experimental group relocated to qualified private housing. Preliminary analyses from several sites indicated beneficial effects of relocation on several outcomes (Ludwig, Duncan, & Pinkston, 2001) , including a salutary influence on asthma attacks in the Boston cohort (Katz et al., 2001 ).
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ITT analysis
Because of imperfect compliance, the causal effect of actual housing on asthma, PrðY ¼ 1jSET½X ¼ 1Þ versus PrðY ¼ 1jSET½X ¼ 0Þ; is not directly identifiable. As described above, there are several alternative options to consider. The first is to perform an ITT analysis, which provides the effect of offering the housing voucher: PrðY ¼ 1jSET½Z ¼ 1Þ versus PrðY ¼ 1jSET½Z ¼ 0Þ: Since Z is actually ''SET'' in this experiment, an unbiased effect estimate is readily obtained by the crude contrast of PrðY ¼ 1jZ ¼ 1Þ versus PrðY ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ: Adjustment for covariates may be made in order to improve precision of this causal estimate, while preserving unbiasedness (Senn, 1989) . The estimate is unbiased because the control and experimental groups are adequate substitutes for the relevant counterfactuals of interest, the outcome prevalences that would have been attained under each of the voucher assignment conditions (Wickramaratne & Holford, 1987; Maldonado & Greenland, 2002) .
With respect to the ITT contrast, the MTO authors assert that ''from the perspective of a policy maker designing a policy that would offer a similar voucher to a similar population, this parameter is directly of interest.'' (Katz et al., 2001, p. 622) . Perhaps they should have been more restrictive: ''ythat would offer a similar voucher to a similar population in a similar mannery,'' because the ITT estimate combines treatment effect with treatment uptake. Not only can the overall effect estimate be improved by encouraging greater compliance, but the uptake proportion may also change in response to the size or administration of the program because of dependency of uptake on the perception of the program as ''experimental'' versus normative (Heckman, 1992) . Or uptake may increase if it becomes known to subsequent participants that the treatment was shown to be ''effective'' in the previous randomized trial (Robins, 1989b) .
There is also an additional source of variability to consider in the ITT contrast, because there generally exist not only fixed counterfactual types with respect to the outcome (e.g., those who would or would not have an asthma attack for either housing type), but also fixed counterfactual types with respect to the uptake (e.g., those who would or would not move under either voucher randomization assignment), both of which are sampled from the total population. This not only creates wider bounds for a causal effect than a single source of variability, but also potentially reduces generalizability if the proportions of either of these fixed types would change in a new setting, for example if recruitment or eligibility requirements changed. Additionally, there is the possibility of correlation between these two sets of potential outcomes, for example, if those who would not move whether offered the voucher or not are also more likely to be people who would not have an asthma attack in either housing condition. If these correlations between potential outcomes vary by setting or implementation, then generalizability is further eroded. For these and other reasons, some have asserted that the ITT estimator actually has limited public health or policy interest, in contrast with estimates of the causal effect of treatment itself (Robins & Greenland, 1996) .
Estimating the causal effect in a subset of the population
The MTO authors focus on the causal effect of housing type, rather than the effect of receiving a voucher, consistent with a primary interest in the etiologic relations between housing and health outcomes (Katz et al., 2001) . In light of the fact that no causal estimate is readily available for the study cohort as target population because of unmeasured confounding factors, the authors narrowed their focus to estimating average causal effect of housing in a subset of the study population via an instrumental variables methodology. This subset is defined in terms of the potential responses of family units (relocate or fail to relocate to a lowpoverty neighborhood) given either of the two randomly imposed interventions (receipt or no receipt of voucher and counseling). An individual family is considered to have deterministic potential responses (reflecting the view that it is itself a realization of various internal and external unmeasured processes), one of which must be counterfactual because a family can only receive one intervention. Because both intervention and response are binary, the resulting response patterns serve to partition the population of families into four subsets: ''compliers'' who would relocate if and only if voucher/ counseling intervention was received; ''always takers'' who would relocate in any event, regardless of intervention; ''never takers'' who would not relocate in any event, regardless of intervention; and ''contrarians'' who would relocate if and only if voucher/counseling intervention was not received.
Under an applicable set of assumptions, the average causal effect of housing relocation (X ) on asthma attack (Y ) for the subset of ''compliers'' in the study population is estimable, despite the presence of confounding by U: This effect is designated by some authors as the ''local average treatment effect'' (LATE) (Angrist et al., 1996) , where ''treatment'' in this descriptive phrase refers to relocating to non-poverty housing. The necessary assumptions are:
(1) Z is independent of U-which follows from randomization of Z and is consistent with the graphical structure in Fig. 3 . (2) Z is associated with X ; i.e., arc b in Fig. 3 is nonnull-as estimated from the observed MTO data. (3) Z is independent of Y given X and U-as implied by the graphical structure in Fig. 3 which shows no direct effect of Z on Y ; i.e., vouchers affect asthma attacks only through the mechanism of relocating family residence (Greenland, 2000) . Because there exist participants in the MTO program who were randomized to receive a voucher (Z ¼ 1), and then received counseling and searched for a qualified rental unit but did not find one, and therefore remained X ¼ 0; the MTO investigators express some skepticism about the veracity of this assumption, but they assert that it is likely to involve only a small bias relative to the actual treatment effect (Katz et al., 2001, pp. 622-623 ). (4) There are no ''contrarians'' in the population.
Although the above assumptions are sufficient for estimability of average relocation (X ) effect on asthma attack (Y ) among ''compliers,'' the MTO study design has an even stronger property than given by Assumption 4, namely, that because of economic barriers to relocation, none of the families who were not offered vouchers relocated to non-poverty neighborhoods (i.e., PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0Þ: This suggests that there are no ''always takers'' in the population, and that the study population therefore consists of just two types: ''compliers'' and ''never takers. '' In order to represent the categories in which the treatment effect can be estimated, the MTO authors provided a table (Katz et al., 2001, p. 624 ), similar to Table 1 shown below. Following the statistical literature on instrumental variables analysis (Angrist et al., 1996) , they defined the unobservable variable C; which distinguishes participants who would move if offered the voucher (''compliers'') from those who would not move even if offered the voucher (''never takers''). Although we know that all those randomized to the experimental arm who move are ''compliers'' (C ¼ 1) because there are no ''always takers,'' and that all those randomized to the experimental arm who fail to move are ''never takers'' (C ¼ 0) because there are no ''contrarians,'' we cannot similarly partition the control arm, because we never have the opportunity to observe which of these participants would fail to move if offered the Table 1 Occurrence of asthma (Y ¼ 1) by sub-groups
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Voucher group Voucher compliers Voucher never-takers 
Control group
Control compliers Control never-takers Table III of Katz et al. (2001, p. 624). voucher. Thus, an identifiable subset to which the LATE estimate applies is the ''compliers,'' and that subset, in fact, comprises all the relocated families in the study (X ¼ 1). For this reason, the MTO authors refer to the LATE as the ''effect of treatment on the treated'' or ''TOT.'' With the above assumptions in place, it is possible to estimate the average treatment effect among those actually treated. The ITT estimate is simply PrðY ¼ 1jZ¼ 1Þ À PrðY ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ; without regard to C: The TOT estimate is PrðY ¼ 1jC ¼ 1; Z¼ 1Þ À PrðY ¼ 1jC ¼ 1; Z ¼ 0Þ; but this contrast is not directly available because the control ''compliers'' cannot be uniquely distinguished from among the group randomized to the control group. Nonetheless, an unbiased estimate of this quantity of interest is
that is, simply the ITT estimate divided by the proportion moving among those offered a voucher (Bloom, 1984) . Note that under perfect compliance, PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1; and the ITT and TOT estimates become identical. Finally, to complete the illustrative example, preliminary data on 570 Boston MTO participant families showed that for the outcome ''any asthma attacks requiring medical attention during the past 6 months'' among children ages 6-15, the covariate adjusted ITT difference ½PrðY ¼ 1jZ¼ 1Þ À PrðY ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ was À0.051. Dividing by the proportion moving among those randomized to the experimental arm PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 1Þ ¼ 0:495; yields an estimate of the TOT=(À0.051/0.495)=À0.103 (Katz et al., 2001, p. 634) .
Limitations of local average treatment effects (LATE)
Note that the TOT cannot be assumed to equal the effect that would be observed in the entire population if moving were forced on all participants, since compliant and non-compliant participants may differ in unmeasured ways that modify the effect of moving on asthma attacks (Greenland, 2000, p. 725) . For example, consider the unmeasured variable ''previous asthma attack.'' Parents with children who experience substantial disability and discomfort due to prevalent asthma might be more likely to be ''compliers'' who would move if offered the voucher, and also more likely to have the outcome, since past asthma attacks are predictive of future attacks.
Furthermore, the MTO experiment was cleverly designed to allow identification of a causal effect of treatment in a subset of the study population whose membership could actually be defined, due to random assignment to a control group that is effectively denied treatment (Angrist et al., 1996, p. 449) . In general, for randomized experiments with incomplete adherence to assigned regimen, there may be violations of the assignment in both groups (e.g., PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þa0 and PrðX ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þa0Þ: In this circumstance, the LATE holds not in a subset defined by whether they received treatment, which can be observed, but rather based on how they would have responded under each assignment, in relation to their value of the unobserved variable C:
The restriction of the LATE estimate to a subset, one for which the membership often cannot be enumerated, is a limitation that some authors argue renders this estimate to be of little utility (Robins & Greenland, 1996) . These authors prefer bounds on the average treatment effect for the entire study cohort, which can often be tightened considerably with additional assumptions, such as the assumption of no ''contrarians.'' For example, given this assumption, which is verifiable in the MTO experiment because treatment was effectively denied to the control group, a large-sample lower bound on the average causal effect of moving (X ¼ 1) on asthma attacks (Y ¼ 1) in the entire study population is simply
whereas a large-sample upper bound is we cannot exclude the possibility that the average causal effect in the entire cohort was harmful. Furthermore, the width of this bound on the average causal effect is exactly equal to the rate of non-compliance: PrðX ¼ 0jZ¼ 1Þ þ PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ; which in this example equals PrðX ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ ¼ 0:505 (Balke & Pearl, 1997) .
Conclusion
Causal inference for social epidemiology is a daunting task, due to a large number of unmeasured or poorly measured covariates in most analytic settings, and their potential confounding influence via perturbations of exposure and outcome. One proposed solution to this dilemma involves randomized trials of social interventions, through which we interrupt all confounding influences on the exposure in order to more readily identify the causal effect. We have shown that although this approach appears to be quite promising by virtue of the impact on potential confounding, the limitations of randomized designs are also quite substantial. Various pragmatic, ethical and conceptual barriers limit the practical conduct of randomized trials of social interventions in many instances. Moreover, even when a randomized trial of a social intervention is achievable, we often find that the causal effect many would wish to obtain, the average causal effect of exposure on the target population, is not readily identifiable, due to imperfect compliance with randomized assignment. Using the example of the MTO experiment, which we consider to be somewhat of a ''best case'' scenario for a carefully thought-out and implemented trial, we showed that plausible assumptions only allow for the estimation of the average causal effect of exposure on a subset of the population, those who were randomized to receive a voucher, opted to move and successfully relocated. These same assumptions support a set of bounds for the average causal effect on the entire study cohort, the width of which is equal to the rate of non-compliance (Balke & Pearl, 1997) . In social experiments in which participants randomized to the control group might actually obtain treatment, however, the identifiable causal effect would be limited to a subset of the study population whose membership could not be enumerated based on observed data. For example, studies of the effects of income supplementation would have to contend with the possibility that those in the control group might find ways to supplement their incomes outside of the randomized program.
For all these reasons, randomized trials are not likely to be a panacea for social epidemiology, although the MTO experiment serves as an excellent example of how such studies can be cleverly conceived and skillfully implemented in order to provide valid causal inferences that complement what we can glean from observational studies. On the other hand, this exposition of causal inference in social epidemiology reveals that we can often improve our science through an understanding of the principles of randomized trials, even when we conduct observational studies. Specifically, one strength of randomized trials is that they force us to be explicit about the exposure in terms of a defined intervention. In order to consider such interventions hypothetically in observational studies, therefore, we need to be similarly explicit. This has long been a deficiency of much of the social epidemiologic literature, and one which renders the question of causal inference essentially meaningless. For example, studies of the ''causal effect'' of education or income, based on surveys of achieved status on the part of participants, invoke no clearly defined hypothetical intervention to which the causal inference would pertain. This makes the question of appropriate covariate control impossible to resolve sensibly, and therefore precludes any attempt to predict on the basis of observed variables the outcome distribution under hypothetical intervention regimens and contrast these for two or more such regimens, which is the very definition of a causal effect estimate (Greenland et al., 1999) . Attention to this facet of causal inference will improve the quality of our observational studies, allowing for the conduct of selective experimental trials to support these inferences, with exposures that correspond in meaningful and interpretable ways.
Because of the exchangeability of experimental (Z ¼ 1) and control (Z ¼ 0) subpopulations with each other and with the total population, this can be modified as follows:
Thus, the ACE½X -Y may be decomposed into the five terms shown above.
The first term is: PrðCÞ Â fPrðY ¼ 1jC; SET ½X ¼ 1Þ À PrðY ¼ 1jC; SET½X ¼ 0Þg:
We have previously shown that PrðY ¼ 1jC; SET ½X ¼ 1Þ À PrðY ¼ 1jC; SET½X ¼ 0Þ; being the average causal effect within the ''compliers'' subpopulation, is estimable as
This first term may therefore be simplified as
The second and third terms of the decomposed ACE are:
Note that observed data provide absolutely no evidence as to what proportion of ''never takers'' would get Y ¼ 1 under SET½X ¼ 1; so that (consistent with the data) the second term can range anywhere from 0 to PrðNÞ ¼ PrðX ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ: On the other hand, the third term, being the proportion within the experimental group (Z ¼ 1) that are ''never takers'' (hence, have X ¼ 0) and get Y ¼ 1; is observationally evaluable as PrðY ¼ 1; X ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ:
These steps simplify the second and third terms to
where the bracketed quantity ½0; PrðX ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ represents the range of uncertainty in this term, and the fact that the data are entirely consistent with a value falling anywhere in the interval from 0 to PrðX ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ:
The fourth and fifth terms of the decomposed ACE are:
The fourth term, being the proportion within the control group (Z ¼ 0) that are ''always takers'' (hence, have X ¼ 1) and get Y ¼ 1; is observationally evaluable as PrðY ¼ 1; X ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ: On the other hand, note that observed data provide absolutely no evidence as to what proportion of ''always takers'' would get Y ¼ 1 under SET½X ¼ 0; so that (consistent with the data) the fifth term can range anywhere from 0 to PrðAÞ ¼ PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ:
These steps simplify the fourth and fifth terms to PrðY ¼ 1; X ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ À ½0; PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ;
where the bracketed quantity [0, PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ] represents the range of uncertainty in this term, and the fact that the data are entirely consistent with a value falling anywhere in the interval from 0 to PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ:
We may therefore now rewrite the decomposition of the average causal effect as
The lower bound on ACE½X -Y ; obtained by selecting the minimum in the first range and the maximum in the second range, is therefore
Likewise, the upper bound on ACE½X -Y ; obtained by selecting the maximum in the first range and the minimum in the second range, is therefore
Further intuitive justification for these bounds: Both upper and lower bounds include the first two terms PrðY ¼ 1jZ¼ 1Þ À PrðY ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ: This difference is just the contribution that the complier subpopulation, C; makes to ACE½X -Y for the total population. The supporting argument is that, for C; the Z conditioning is replaceable by equivalent X conditioning. On the other hand, for the always takers, A; and the never takers, N; the Z conditioning is replaceable by identical X conditioning (either X ¼ 0 or X ¼ 1) in each of the two probabilities, leading to a net of zero.
Lower bound: The first term subtracted from the lower bound above, PrðY ¼ 1; X ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ; is the largest negative contribution that the N can possibly make to ACE½X -Y : As supporting argument, note that this probability is, jointly, the probability of N in the population and Y ¼ 1 under intervention X ¼ 0: This becomes a full negative contribution to ACE½X -Y if, in fact, the probability that Y ¼ 1 under the (counterfactual) intervention X ¼ 1 in the N subpopulation were to be zero.
The second term subtracted from the lower bound, PrðY ¼ 0; X ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ; is the largest negative contribution that the A can possibly make to ACE½X -Y : As supporting argument, note that this probability is, jointly, the probability of A in the population and that Y ¼ 0 under intervention X ¼ 1: If the probability that Y ¼ 1 under the (counterfactual) intervention X ¼ 0 in the A subpopulation were, in fact, 1, then the joint probability of A and that Y ¼ 1 under counterfactual intervention X ¼ 0 would be PrðAÞ ¼ PrðX ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ; its largest possible value. It follows that the maximum negative contribution by A to ACE½X -Y would be
Lower bound: The first term added to the upper bound, PrðY ¼ 0; X ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ; is the largest positive contribution that the N can possibly make to ACE½X -Y : As supporting argument, note that this probability is, jointly, the probability of N in the population and that Y ¼ 0 under intervention X ¼ 0: If the probability that Y ¼ 1 under the (counterfactual) intervention X ¼ 1 in the N subpopulation were, in fact, 1, then the joint probability of N and that Y ¼ 1 under counterfactual intervention X ¼ 1 would be PrðNÞ ¼ PrðX ¼ 0jZ ¼ 1Þ; its largest possible value. It follows that the maximum contribution by N to ACE½X -Y would be
The second term added to the upper bound, PrðY ¼ 1; X ¼ 1jZ ¼ 0Þ; is the largest positive contribution that the A can possibly make to ACE½X -Y : As supporting argument, note that this probability is, jointly, the probability of A in the population and that Y ¼ 1 under intervention X ¼ 1: This becomes the full contribution to ACE½X -Y if, in fact, the probability that Y ¼ 1 under the (counterfactual) intervention X ¼ 0 in the A subpopulation were to be zero.
